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LIQUOR LIABILITY AND
BLAME-SHIFTING DEFENSES:
DO THEY MIX?
MADELEINE E. KELLY*
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed an increasing rejection of the
old common law rule that one injured by an intoxicated per-
son has no redress against an overly generous bartender or
social host. The proffered reason for the old rule-that it is
the drinking, not the serving, that is the proximate cause of
the injuries-has been worn thin by changing concepts of cau-
sation in tort cases1 and an increasing awareness of the star-
tling numbers of alcohol-related deaths on the highways each
year.2
State by state, courts are rejecting the outdated immunity
for servers of alcohol, recognizing as beyond dispute that it is
reasonably foreseeable that an overserved patron or guest,
particularly one who drives a car, is likely to be injured or to
cause injury to others. Some courts struggle to make limiting
distinctions: vendors, but not social hosts, should be subject
to liability;3 liability should be allowed for service to minors,
but not intoxicated adults;4 "innocent" third parties can re-
cover for injuries, but not those who have been injured as a
* B.S., Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1976; J.D., Marquette Uni-
versity Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1980; member, Cannon & Dunphy, S.C.,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. See, e.g., Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 731, 176 N.W.2d 566, 569 (1970).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court discarded the much criticized "proximate cause" ration-
ale for the rule of nonliability in liquor cases but determined nevertheless, that as a
matter of public policy, liability should not be permitted. Id. Garcia and the nonliabil-
ity cases on which it was based were overruled in Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627,
648, 350 N.W.2d 108, 119 (1984) and Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 264, 366
N.W.2d 857, 859 (1985). See also Vesely v. Sager, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630, 486 P.2d 151,
158 (1971).
2. See Demoulin & Whitcomb, Social Host's Liability in Furnishing Alcoholic Bev-
erages, 27 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 349, 349 (1977).
3. See Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300
(1964); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1975).
4. See, e.g., Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983) (social host/adult
guest - liability not permitted); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973).
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result of their own intoxication or who have actively contrib-
uted to the offender's intoxicated state.'
Other courts have liberally applied negligence principles to
render social hosts6 and even other bar partrons7 liable for
overserving intoxicated adults-a result that sends chills
down the spine of the liquor and insurance industries and
that, in some instances, has triggered immediate legislative re-
sponses to abolish or limit liability. The imposition of liquor
liability may be based upon state dram shop acts that ex-
pressly create a cause of action,9 liquor control statutes that
have been adopted by courts to establish negligence per selo or
common-law negligence, without regard to the existence of a
statute. 11
Although there is a decided trend toward imposing civil
liability on sellers of alcohol, there is some resistance to apply-
ing the same rule to social hosts. This is most evident in those
jurisdictions where seller liability is based on the violation of
See discussion in Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter, 258 Or. 632, _, 485 P.2d 18, 21 nn.3-
4; Coulter v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lamott, 289 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1979); Harris v. Hurlburt,
83 Misc. 2d 626, 373 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1975); see also cases cited in Annot., 26 A.L.R.3D
1112 (1969).
6. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1985).
7. Ashlock v. Norris, - Ind. App. -, 475 N.E.2d 1167 (1985).
8. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b), (c) (West 1984) and CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1714(b), (c) (abrogating the judicial creation of liability and reluctantly upheld in
Cory v. Shierloh, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 629 P.2d 8 (1981), against a constitutional chal-
lenge). See also 1985 Wis. Laws 47.
9. See 12 AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 2 (1966) for a listing of those jurisdictions with
dram shop acts. Such acts are often narrowly construed to apply only to vendors of
alcohol and not social hosts. See Comment, Imposition of Liability on Social Hosts in
Drunk Driving Cases: A Judicial Response Mandated by Principles of Common Law and
Common Sense, 69 MARQ. L. REV. - (1986).
10. All states have some kind of liquor control statute which prohibits the sale,
furnishing or "giving away" of alcoholic beverages to minors or intoxicated persons. In
Wisconsin, the current statute is WIs. STAT. § 125.07(1), (2) (1983-84). Wisconsin has
also recently enacted legislation to limit liability to those circumstances where a person
is forced to consume alcohol or a third person is injured as a result of the conduct of an
underaged person served alcohol by one who knew or should have known that the un-
deraged person was under the legal drinking age. 1985 Wis. Laws 47.
11. See Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d. 1219; Gamma Phi Chapter, 258 Or. 632,
485 P.2d. 18 (court expressly declined to interpret the state's liquor control statute as
imposing a duty with respect to third persons but concluded that common law tort
principles apply to the service of alcohol).
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liquor control statutes.12 Some courts reason that while such
statutes prohibit "giving away" alcohol to intoxicated persons
or minors, the legislative intent was nevertheless to regulate
licensed businesses and not to set a standard of care for social
hosts. 13 Other courts have refused to scrutinize liquor control
statutes with such a narrow focus. These courts have con-
cluded that the legislative purpose is to protect the public and,
specifically, intoxicated minors or persons themselves from the
harm threatened by the service of alcohol to such persons re-
gardless of whether the alcohol is served or sold by a bar-
tender, a liquor store or a social host.' 4
The resolution of the vendor/social host issue only begins
the liquor liability analysis. Once liability is recognized and
the potentially liable parties defined, the courts must still de-
cide whether all of the defenses generally available in negli-
gence actions apply in the liquor liability context. Is
contributory negligence a defense to an action brought by an
intoxicated minor or adult? Should the negligence of the in-
toxicated minor or adult even be considered in comparative
fault jurisdictions? Should recovery be allowed only for inju-
ries to third parties and not to the injured inebriate himself?
Does it make a difference if the injured inebriate is a minor?
Should a drinking companion, as opposed to an "innocent"
third party, be barred from recovery?
This article will address these blame-shifting questions in
light of the purposes for imposing liability on providers of al-
cohol. The conflicting approaches of some of the courts
which have faced these issues will be discussed and cases in
analogous areas will be reviewed. Finally, a proposal will be
made for an alternative way to accommodate the competing
policies in liquor liability cases.
12. See generally Comment, supra note 9, at nn.24-46. But see Koback, 123 Wis. 2d
259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the liquor control
statute by its terms and pursuant to its underlying policy applied to social hosts as well
as vendors).
13. See generally Comment, supra note 9.
14. See, e.g., Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 47 A.2d 515 (1983);
Koback, 123 Wis. 2d at 276, 366 N.W.2d at 864.
1986]
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I. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In addressing the contributory negligence defense, the
cases run the gamut from finding the defense a complete bar
to recovery to finding it to be no defense at all. On which end
of the spectrum a case falls depends on where the court fo-
cuses its attention. Some courts focus on the plaintiff's culpa-
bility and take a hardened view, finding, in effect, that those
who become intoxicated deserve whatever injuries they get as
a result, notwithstanding the fact that the provider may have
acted illegally in providing the alcohol. When a court focuses
on the underlying purposes of liquor liability, it is far more
likely to determine that the injured plaintiff falls within the
class sought to be protected from inability to exercise self-pro-
tective care and to conclude that it would be anomalous to
consider this negligence. 5
A. Contributory Negligence as a Complete Defense
Some courts still adhere to vestiges of the old rationale
that it is the drinking, not the provision of alcohol, that is the
proximate cause of the injuries and thus conclude that intoxi-
cated persons cannot recover for their own injuries. In Folda
v. City of Bozeman 16 the Montana Supreme Court determined
that a seventeen year old girl's voluntary intoxication consti-
tuted contributory negligence barring the wrongful death
claim brought against the bar that had illegally served her.
Voluntary intoxication will not excuse the degree of care
that a person must take for his or her own safety. We think
the evidence supports a conclusion that Mary Folda [plain-
tiff's deceased daughter] voluntarily became intoxicated, that
she disregarded her duty to use due care for her own safety,
and that this was a proximate cause of her death."7
The deceased patron's contributory negligence in becom-
ing intoxicated was also held to preclude recovery from the
bar owners in Swartzenberger v. Billings Labor Temple. 8 In
that case the decedent drank for several hours at the defend-
ant's bar and became visibly intoxicated. While leaving the
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 comments c-e (1965).
16. 177 Mont. 537, 582 P.2d 767 (1978).
17. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 772 (citation omitted).
18. 179 Mont. 145, 586 P.2d 712 (1978).
[Vol. 69:217
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bar, he fell down the stairs and sustained injuries which re-
sulted in his death. Although recognizing that the service of
alcohol to an intoxicated person in violation of state liquor
control statutes may well have constituted negligence per se,
the court determined that the plaintiff's actions also violated
state law prohibiting public intoxication and constituted con-
tributory negligence that "intervened and became the proxi-
mate cause of his death," barring the claim against the seller.19
Although this reasoning would bar even a third party's claim
against the alcohol provider, the court in Swartzenberger dis-
tinguished a previous federal case 0 on the ground that the
plaintiff in that case was an innocent third party.2'
Other courts refuse to rely on the proximate cause ration-
ale for rejecting an intoxicated person's claim. Rather, the
courts directly assert that those who fail to exercise modera-
tion and temperance can find no solace in the courts for inju-
ries they've inflicted upon themselves. Accordingly, New
York recognizes a dram shop cause of action for an injured
third party, but not for the intoxicated person. In Allen v.
Westchester,22 the court denied the claim of a widow who
sought damages for the conscious pain and suffering of her
deceased husband who became intoxicated, fell and sustained
fatal injuries at a bar owned by the defendant. The court's
quotation from the reasoning of a California case 23 aptly illus-
trates the disdain that underlies the court's distinction be-
tween "innocent" third parties and the imbiber in dram shop
cases:
The inestimable gift of reason and self-control cries out for
preservation in every person, and the duty of its preservation
devolves upon each member of the public. When the re-
straint of reason and the ability to care for one's self are per-
19. Id. at -, 586 P.2d at 715.
20. Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969).
21. Swartzenberger, 179 Mont. at _, 586 P.2d at 715. The significance of this dis-
tinction is questionable. Later, in Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d. 145 (1979),
the Montana Supreme Court held that the sanctions for violating state liquor control
laws did not create a cause of action in favor of third persons injured when a minor was
served intoxicants. Although this case arguably applies only to social hosts, its dicta
indicates that the court is wedded to the notion that the "proximate cause" is the act of
the imbiber, not the act of the seller. Id. at -, 586 P.2d at 147.
22. 109 A.D.2d 475, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1985).
23. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976).
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verted by a conscious, self-indulgent act of voluntary
intoxication which temporarily casts off those powers, no so-
cietal or personal wrong, nor violation of public or social
policy is accomplished or violated if the actor is alone held
answerable for his injury ....
Governmental paternalism protecting people from their
own conscious folly fosters individual irresponsibility and is
normally to be discouraged. To go yet another step and al-
low monetary recovery to one who knowingly becomes in-
toxicated and thereby injures himself is in our view morally
indefensible.24
The same result was more circuitously reached by the
Ohio Court of Appeals in Tome v. Berea Pewter Mug, Inc. 25
There, two minors became intoxicated at the defendant's bar
and were subsequently injured when one of them drove their
car into a pole. The court held that an intoxicated person
would be held to the same standard of care as a sober person
and is subject to the contributory negligence defense in a neg-
ligence action against a tavernkeeper. At the time of the acci-
dent, Ohio's comparative negligence statute, had not yet been
enacted, and contributory negligence would have been a com-
plete bar. In an apparent effort to avoid the harshness of this
rule, the plaintiffs alleged that the tavernkeeper's conduct in
serving the minors went beyond mere negligence and consti-
tuted "willful and wanton misconduct," to which contribu-
tory negligence is not a defense under Ohio law. The court of
appeals determined, however, that such willful and wanton
behavior does not vitiate the assumption of risk defense and
that the plaintiffs "assumed the risk of injury when they drove
away in an intoxicated state."2 6 The assumption of risk de-
fense is available "even though [the] person's, capacity to ap-
preciate the risk is diminished because of voluntary
intoxication. 2 7
24. Id. at 855-56, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (citations omitted).
25. 4 Ohio App. 3d 98, 446 N.E.2d 848 (1982).
26. Id. at -, 446 N.E.2d at 855 (citing Kellerman v. J.S. Durig Co., 176 Ohio St.
320, 199 N.E.2d 562 (1964)).
27. Tome, 4 Ohio App. 3d at -, 446 N.E.2d at 853.
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B. Contributory Negligence as No Defense
In the seminal liquor liability case, Rappaport v. Nichols, 28
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that minors have "very
special susceptibilities" which are exacerbated when they
"partake of alcoholic beverages. ' 29 Similarly, in Christiansen
v. Campbell °0 the South Carolina Court of Appeals remarked
that the state's liquor control statutes prohibit the sale of li-
quor to intoxicated persons "to protect intoxicated persons
from their own incompetence and helplessness. The statute
represents the legislature's judgment that an intoxicated per-
son is a menace to himself."3 1
Neither the Rappaport nor the Christiansen case discuss
the applicability of the contributory negligence defense in li-
quor liability cases. However, it is but a short step from their
reasoning in support of liability to a determination that an in-
jured inebriate's contributory negligence should not be consid-
ered a defense in an action against the providers of alcohol.
The foundation for such a defense-barring rule can be found
in cases in other areas where there are safety statutes designed
to protect individuals against their inability to exercise self-
protective care, including members of such particular groups
as construction workers, child labor factory workers and con-
sumers using dangerous products.32
1. Safety Statute Violation Cases
Some safety statutes such as the Safety Appliance Act 33
and the Boiler Inspection Act 34 specifically state that the con-
tributory negligence defense is not available.35 In these cases,
the legislative intent is clear and will be honored. More often
than not, however, a safety statute or other protective legisla-
28. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
29. Id. at -, 156 A.2d at 8.
30. 328 S.E.2d 351 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
31. Id. at 354 (citations omitted).
32. D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983); see also Woods,
The Negligence Case: Comparative Fault, in COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND STATU-
TORY VIOLATIONS § 10:3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Woods, Comparative Fault]; Pros-
ser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of a Statute, 32 MINN. L. REv. 105
(1948).
33. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1982).
34. Id. at §§ 22-23.
35. Id. at § 53.
1986]
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tion will be silent on contributory negligence, and the courts
must determine whether contributory negligence should bar
or diminish the plaintiff's right to recovery. Certain types of
statutes, such as child labor statutes and laws banning the sale
of firearms to minors, are enacted to protect children against
their own negligent propensities.36 When statutes of this type
are involved, the contributory negligence defense has been re-
jected, even in comparative negligence jurisdictions where
such a defense would not necessarily prevent, but only dimin-
ish, recovery. 37 The prohibition of the defense has consist-
ently been applied in child labor cases: 38
The very purpose of the statute is to protect the child under
14 years of age from the consequences of imprudence, negli-
gence or lack of care and caution, which on account of the
immaturity of youth and the lack of experience, discretion
and judgment is characteristic of children within the prohib-
ited age; and to hold that a child employed in violation of
this statute is chargeable with contributory negligence would
defeat the very purpose of the statute.39
The same reasoning has been applied to the sale of a gun
to a minor in violation of state statute when the minor is sub-
sequently injured by an accidental discharge. 4° Similarly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court refused to recognize a comparative
negligence defense where the defendant sold glue to a thirteen
year old child in violation of a statute designed to prevent
glue-sniffing tragedies. The child's minor companion drowned
as a result of glue-sniffing intoxication.4 1
36. See Prosser, supra note 32; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 com-
ment (1977).
37. Woods, Comparative Fault, supra note 32, at § 10:3.
38. See, e.g., Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 147 Ark. 448, 225 S.W. 887 (1920); Hart-
well Handle Co. v. Jack, 149 Miss. 465, 115 So. 586 (1928); D. L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis.
2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983).
39. Hartwell Handle Co., 149 Miss. at -, 115 So. at 588.
40. See, e.g., Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 109 So. 2d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. dismissed, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959). But see Arrendondo v. Duckwall Stores,
Inc., 227 Kan. 842, _, 610 P.2d 1107, 1113 (1980) (Kansas Supreme Court held state's
comparative negligence act applied where the defendant was alleged to have violated the
statute prohibiting sales of explosives to minors).
41. Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973). See also Van Gaas-
beck v. Webatuck Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 21 N.Y.2d 239, 234 N.E.2d 243, 287
N.Y.S.2d 77 (1967) (contributory negligence of a child is not to be considered when
safety procedures on school buses are not followed).
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It is not only children who are given special protection
from the contributory negligence defense. Adults who are
deemed particularly vulnerable, usually by a dangerous work-
ing environment, have also been given special treatment in
some cases. Very recently, in a case involving an Illinois
safety statute designed to protect construction workers, the Il-
linois Supreme Court reiterated its absolute fidelity to the
stringent requirements of the act by refusing to allow the com-
parative fault affirmative defense. 2 In Prewein v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co.,43 an ironworker brought an action for injuries
sustained when the hydraulic lift he was using for support top-
pled. The plaintiff alleged numerous violations of the Illinois
Structural Work Act.44 In response the defendants urged that
any damage award must be reduced, pursuant to the state's
comparative negligence law, by the plaintiff's contributory
fault. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the purpose of the
Act was to afford complete protection for construction work-
ers and should not be weakened by allowing the comparative
negligence defense. In contrast to the above approach, other
courts, in cases involving adults and in the absence of a clearly
implied legislative intent to preclude the contributory negli-
gence defense, have generally permitted the defense notwith-
standing the violation of a safety statute.46
42. See Prewein v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 141, 483 N.E.2d 224 (1985).
43. Id.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1981).
45. Prewein, 108 Ill. 2d at _, 483 N.E.2d at 225 (1985). See also Simmons v.
Union Electric Co., 104 Ill. 2d 444, 473 N.E.2d 946 (1984); Evans v. Nab Const. Corp.,
80 A.D.2d 841, 436 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1981) (comparative fault not a partial defense to
action againt contractor for injuries caused by defective scaffolding since New York
Labor Law imposes absolute liability for injuries to workmen resulting from defective
scaffolding).
46. See Long v. Forest - Fehlhaber, 55 N.Y.2d 154, 433 N.E.2d 115, 448 N.Y.S.2d
132 (1982); Duva v. Flushing Hosp. & Medical Center, 108 Misc. 2d 900, 439 N.Y.S.2d
268 (1981); Brons v. Bischoff, 89 Wis. 2d 80, 277 N.W.2d 854 (1979) (violation of safe
place statute and its presumption of causation does not establish as a matter of law that
defendant's negligence was greater than the plaintiffs' negligence); Lovesee v. Allied
Dev. Corp., 45 Wis. 2d 840, 173 N.W.2d 196 (1970) (comparative negligence applied to
safe place statute violation cases); see also Hardy v. Monsanto Enviro-Chem. Sys. Inc.,
414 Mich. 29, -, 323 N.W.2d 270, 273 (1982) and Brown v. Unit Prod. Corp., 123
Mich. App. 157, 333 N.W.2d 204 (1983) (comparative negligence is available in an
action involving inherently dangerous activities in the work place). But see Bennett
Drug Stores, Inc. v. Mosely, 67 Ga. App. 347, 20 S.E.2d 208 (1942) (Georgia Court of
Appeals refused to permit consideration of contributory negligence when the defendant
drug store violated a statute in failing to warn intoxicated purchaser of carbolic acid of
1986]
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2. Liquor Liability Cases
In the liquor liability area, the availability of the contribu-
tory negligence defense is a crucial question, particularly in
jurisdictions where contributory negligence is a complete bar
to recovery. Permitting the defense is effectively the same as
holding that there is no cause of action on behalf of persons
injured as a result of their own intoxication. It would be rare
for a jury to find that the plaintiff, injured as a result of self-
intoxication, was not contributorily negligent. However, in
some courts' view, it is precisely because of the intoxicated
person's or the minor's diminished capacity that serving alco-
hol to such a person violates the statute and common sense.
Such persons are presumptively incapable of appreciating the
consequences of their actions and acting in accordance with
reasoned judgment.47 The few courts that have squarely
framed the issue in these terms have often concluded that con-
tributory negligence is not a defense.
New Jersey and Pennsylvania took the early lead in this
area.48 In Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc. ,49 a case decided
before comparative negligence was adopted in New Jersey, the
New Jersey Superior Court rejected the contributory negli-
gence defense, stating:
The accountability [of the vendor of alcohol] may not be di-
luted by the fault of the patron for that would tend to nullify
its poisonous character; purchaser held to be within the class designed to be protected
by the statute).
47. This is the reasoning of the disability or diminished capacity cases that have
rejected the contributory negligence defense. Most of these cases involve very small
children. See Toetschinger v. Ihnot, 312 Minn. 59, 250 N.W.2d 204 (1977); Yun Jeong
Koo v. St. Bernard, 89 Misc. 2d 775, 392 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1977); Woods, Comparative
Negligence, supra note 32, at § 12. Other courts have dealt with the issue by giving a
special child standard of care instruction, which calls upon the jury of adults to imagine
what a "reasonably prudent" child of the same age, experience, and intelligence would
have done.
Under the Wisconsin view, the child's age, experience and capacity is considered
first in determining whether the child was negligent and again in comparing the negli-
gence of the parties. Metcalf v. Consolidated Badger Coop. 28 Wis. 2d 552, 137
N.W.2d 457 (1965).
48. Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966). See also
Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1961); Buckley v. Pirolo, 190 N.J.
Super. 491, 464 A.2d 1136 (1983) (contributory negligence could be a defense unless the
plaintiff was so intoxicated as to be unable to exercise self-protective care); Schelin v.
Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
49. 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630.
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the very aid being afforded. Since the patron has become a
danger to himself and is in no position to exercise self-pro-
tective care, it is right and proper that the law view the re-
sponsibility as that of the tavern keeper alone.5°
The Soronen court rejected out of hand the argument that the
imposition of responsibility for serving an intoxicated person
imposes an undue burden, "for the tavern keeper may readily
protect himself by the exercise of reasonable care."51
Subsequently, in Rhyner v. Madden,5 2 a case decided after
New Jersey adopted comparative negligence, the defendants
argued that the Soronen rule should no longer apply because
contributory negligence would not necessarily bar, but only
diminish, recovery. The court rejected this argument:
That argument ignores the fact that the conduct of the negli-
gent tavern, in violating the regulations by serving visibly
intoxicated patrons, is creating or contributing to the very
condition which the tavern urges as the basis of a claim of
plaintiff's negligence: that of being intoxicated. It is illogical
to hold that a defendant tavern has a duty not to serve an
intoxicated patron, but it may escape liability by breaching
that duty in serving the patron and then alleging that the
plaintiff was negligent in rendering himself intoxicated.53
In Schelin v. Goldberg,5 4 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
addressed the effect of the repeal of the dram shop civil liabil-
ity act which the state court had construed to prohibit the
contributory negligence defense. 5 Although a liquor law still
existed which prohibited the sale of liquor to minors and the
visibly intoxicated, the vendor urged that the judicial rule bar-
ring the contributory negligence defense should have expired
with the repealed legislation explicitly providing for civil dram
shop liability.5 6 The court determined that, notwithstanding
the repeal of the civil liability act, the violation of the surviv-
ing liquor control statute was negligence. The court con-
cluded that the pre-existing rule prohibiting the contributory
negligence defense was linked not to the civil liability statute
50. Id. at, 218 A.2d at 636.
51. Id. at -, 218 A.2d at 637.
52. 188 N.J. Super. 544, 457 A.2d 1243 (1982).
53. Id. at _, 457 A.2d at 1246 (citation omitted).
54. 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
55. Id. at 346-48, 146 A.2d 650-52.
56. Id. at 344-46, 146 A.2d at 650-51.
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but to the liquor control statute which made it unlawful to sell
alcohol to intoxicated persons or minors. Therefore, the rule
prohibiting application of the contributory negligence defense
survived the repeal of the civil liability act."
Some courts have taken a different route to the same end
and avoided the contributory negligence defense by determin-
ing that the provider's conduct is inherently more culpable
than the drinker's conduct. 8 This route is an application of
the general rule that contributory negligence is not a defense if
the defendant's conduct is willful or wanton. This willful or
wanton exception evolved as a way to avoid the harshness of
the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to
recovery.59
With the advent of comparative negligence, some jurisdic-
tions abolished the willful or wanton exception,60 although it
remained intact in others.61 In the few liquor liability cases
that activated the somewhat dormant willful, wanton excep-
tion, the facts were particularly tragic. In Ewing v. Cloverleaf
Bowl, 62 a bar owner was sued for the wrongful death by acute
alcohol poisoning of a young patron who had just turned
twenty-one years old. The bartender served the patron ten
straight shots of 151-proof rum, a vodka collins and two beer
chasers in less than an hour and a half. The patron died the
next day, leaving two small children. The trial court granted
the defendant's non-suit motion finding as a matter of law that
the drinking patron's conduct constituted contributory negli-
57. Id. See also Majors v. Brodhead, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
58. See, e.g., Jennings, 289 F.2d at 19; Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389,
572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605
(1979).
59. Woods, Comparative Fault, supra note 32, at § 7.
60. See generally id. See also Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 14-16, 114 N.W.2d
105, 111-13 (1962) in which the court states that the negligence of tortfeasors should be
decided only on a relative fault basis and suggests that under Wisconsin's comparative
negligence laws there is no room for different degrees of negligence.
61. See Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 556 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1977); Sorensen v.
Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d. 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980); Montag v. Board of Educ. 112
Ill. App. 3d 1039, 446 N.E.2d 299 (1983) (adoption of comparative negligence in Illinois
has not led to an elimination of the willful and wanton standard); Randall v. Harold,
121 Mich. App. 212, 328 N.W.2d 622 (1982); Derenberger v. Lutey, 674 P.2d 485
(Mont. 1983); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979) (when defendant is
guilty of willful and wanton misconduct, the plaintiff's contributory negligence should
not reduce his damages).
62. 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13.
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gence and that the bartender's conduct did not constitute will-
ful misconduct. The California Supreme Court disagreed,
finding that a jury could conclude that the bartender's con-
duct met the willful misconduct standard "sufficiently lacking
in consideration for the right of others, reckless, heedless to an
extreme, and indifferent to the consequences it may impose
",63
Although Nevada had enacted a comparative negligence
statute that subsumed "gross negligence," the Nevada
Supreme Court in Davies v. Butler64 held that wanton and
willful misconduct was still qualitatively different from, and
could not be diminished by, the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence. John Davies died of alcohol poisoning after a day en-
gaged in defendant's "drinking club's" membership initiation
activities which consisted mostly of drinking, some of it alleg-
edly forced.
The evidence in the instant case supports an instruction re-
garding willful or wanton misconduct of the respondents.
The jury could conclude that the intent of respondents was
to administer dangerous quantities of alcohol to Davies
within a short period of time. 190-proof alcohol was deliber-
ately chosen to be administered, as it had been on previous
occasions, and respondents were fully aware of its nature.
Further, they were aware that retention of large amounts of
alcohol in the system can be highly dangerous, as an initiate
had had to be hospitalized the year before.6"
Under these circumstances, the Davies court determined that
comparative negligence was not intended to abolish the rule
that contributory negligence is not a defense to willful or wan-
ton conduct."
Particularly where minors are involved, the willful or wan-
ton exception to the contributory negligence defense may
prove to be crucial to survival beyond pre-trial motions of
claims by those injured through their own intoxication. Mi-
nors are generally viewed as being far less equipped to handle
the effect of alcohol than adults. Add to this their relative
inexperience at driving and there is an even greater likelihood
63. Id. at 402, 572 P.2d at 1161, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
64. 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979).
65. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 611.
66. Id.
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of injury. An adult who knowingly serves alcohol to a minor,
to the point of intoxication, may have to do little more to be
found to have acted willfully and wantonly.
II. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Most states have adopted some form of comparative negli-
gence theory,67 which generally ameliorates the harshness of
the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to re-
covery. Even in comparative negligence jurisdictions, courts
must still evaluate whether, as a matter of policy, the applica-
tion of comparative fault in liquor liability cases should be
prohibited where the injured person and the intoxicated per-
son fall within the same protected class. In Soronen and
Rhyner, discussed above, the New Jersey court determined
that the application of comparative negligence theory in liquor
liability cases would be improper. Only a few other courts
have addressed this question and the trend seems to be in
favor of applying comparative negligence.68
For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has deter-
mined that the definition of fault in the state's comparative
fault statute is expansive enough to include liquor liability ac-
tions because such actions are predicated on strict liability,
which was expressly included in the definition of fault.69 In
Munford, Inc. v. Peterson,70 the Mississippi Supreme Court,
with very little discussion, found reversible error in the trial
court's instruction to the jury that the plaintiff's minor dece-
dent could not be charged with any negligence or fault and
67. See Woods, Comparative Fault, supra note 32, at § 4.
68. See, e.g., Herrly v. Muzik, 355 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (drinking
companion claimant's negligence will be compared to providers' negligence); Munford,
Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979) (where the defendant violated the law by
selling intoxicants to a group of minors, one of whom was later killed in a one-car
accident, the defendant was negligent as a matter of law, but the trial court erred in
failing to instruct on comparative negligence). Dynarski v. U-Crest Fire District, 112
Misc. 2d 314, 447 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1981) (minor decedent's negligence is not a bar to
recovery but will be compared with that of social host). But see Buckley v. Pirolo, 190
N.J. Super. 491, 464 A.2d 1136 (1983) (comparative negligence applies apparently only
because the plaintiffs did not contend that they were also intoxicated or their judgments
impaired at the time of the accident).
69. Muzik, 355 N.W.2d at 452.
70. 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979).
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determined that the usual comparative negligence scheme
should have been applied.
Wisconsin has not yet addressed the question of whether
comparative negligence applies in liquor liability cases.71
Comparative negligence theory has, however, consistently
been applied to all types of actions in Wisconsin, even to strict
liability actions.72
III. THE COMPLICITY DEFENSE
Should the drinking companion who is later injured by the
intoxicated conduct of a cohort be barred from recovery be-
cause of complicity? It appears that there will be the same
split of authorities on this issue as there is on the contributory
negligence question when the plaintiff is the intoxicated per-
son seeking recovery from the dram shop.73
The rationale of the complicity defense is that wrongdoers
should not benefit from their own wrongs by "voluntarily and
affirmatively participat[ing] in inducing the intoxication of a
person . . . . 74 Essentially, the complicity defense is a spe-
cies of assumption of risk.75 In Minnesota, where comparative
fault has been adopted, complicity has been treated as a type
of contributory negligence which is included in the compara-
tive fault analysis.76 Where the person acting in complicity is
also within a protected class (such as a minor or intoxicated
person), however, it would be expected that the courts that
71. Wisconsin's new civil liability law, 1985 wis. Laws 47, generally limits recovery
to claims of third persons injured by underage persons; the contributory negligence is-
sue still exists where the injured third person also falls within the protected class: intox-
icated persons or minors.
72. See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
73. The case law runs both ways. Morris v. Farley Enterprises, Inc., 661 P.2d 167,
171 (Alaska 1983) (complicity not to be considered when plaintiff is within the pro-
tected class); Bakke v. Rainbow Club, Inc., 306 Minn. 99, 235 N.W.2d 375 (1975) (de-
cedent assumed the risk of his own injury and death by furnishing intoxicating liquor to
companion); Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395, 401, 181 N.W.2d 692, 695
(1970) (complicity as a defense); Muzik v. Herrly, 355 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
74. Heveron, 288 Minn. at 401, 181 N.W.2d at 695.
75. See Muzik, 355 N.W.2d at 454.
76. Id. at 454-55.
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reject the contributory negligence defense in actions by the
drinker would also reject the complicity defense.77
Consider Morris v. Farley Enterprises, Inc. ,78 where the de-
fendant taverns argued that the minor decedents' complicity
in contributing to the minor driver's intoxication should bar
their claims. The court rejected the defense, essentially be-
cause the minor decedents were also members of the class that
the liquor control statute was designed to protect and
[i]t would run counter to the purpose on which we have ac-
ted in adopting the statute as a negligence standard, and thus
to the policy of the statute itself, to hold that a minor is
barred from maintaining an action by his own illegal role in
the liquor's acquisition. As between the seller and the mi-
nor, it is the seller who is the responsible party in the
transaction.79
Although the court found that complicity did not bar the ac-
tion, the court failed to decide the question of whether com-
parative negligence might be asserted as a partial defense.8 °
IV. A CONCLUDING PROPOSAL
Although some courts have held that liquor control stat-
utes are designed only to protect "innocent" members of the
general public from the dangers posed by intoxicated persons,
the more reasoned view of liquor liability in today's world is
that such statutes demonstrate a legislative recognition of the
commonly-known fact that intoxicated adults or minors are
not fully able to exercise reasonable care. They are apt to
make poor judgments, are likely to be physically impaired by
their intoxication and are certainly not likely to be able to op-
erate an automobile carefully. They pose a risk of harm not
just to the general public, but to themselves, which may be
avoided if servers of alcohol refuse to pour that "one more for
the road" and refuse to serve underage persons.
77. Cf. Buckley, 190 N.J. Super. 491, 464 A.2d 1136 (court suggested that if the
injured party was too intoxicated to exercise self-protective care, his negligence in ex-
posing himself to the risk posed by the intoxicated companion would not be
considered).
78. 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983).
79. Id. at 171.
80. Id. at 171 n.7.
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In jurisdictions where contributory negligence is a com-
plete bar to recovery, alcohol providers should not be permit-
ted to avoid their responsibility by asserting the minor's or
intoxicated person's voluntary consumption as a complete de-
fense. In those jurisdictions, where one party must bear the
entire burden, it should be the provider because to hold other-
wise would defeat the deterrence rationale used to support im-
position of liability in the first place. At the very least, the
willful, wanton exception, which is a way of comparing rela-
tive degrees of fault, should be liberally applied in the liquor
liability context.
In comparative negligence jurisdictions, there is an under-
standable reluctance to totally absolve drinkers of responsibil-
ity for their own injuries. Nevertheless, the liquor provider
has the last clear chance to prevent a potentially fatal situation
since the intoxicated adult or minor is not as equipped to so-
berly evaluate the risks in further drinking. The liquor pro-
vider, therefore, is in effect entrusted with the greater duty to
reasonably control the flow of alcohol. The imposition of li-
quor liability is designed to deter liquor providers from
neglecting this responsibility. However, if the usual compara-
tive negligence analysis is applied, liquor providers will at-
tempt to shift all responsibility to the drinker. To the extent
that they are successful, especially in actions brought by the
drinker for his or her own injuries, the deterrence purpose of
imposing liability will be frustrated.
This result could be avoided without totally absolving the
drinker. One who was causally negligent in serving alcohol to
an intoxicated adult or minor should be held as a matter of
law, as between the drinker and the provider, to be more neg-
ligent than the drinker whose intoxication resulted in injury.
This rule would apply both with respect to a drinker's actions
for his or her own injuries and with respect to the provider's
right to contribution from the drinker in a third-party action.
In an action brought by a drinker for his or her own inju-
ries, a jury would assess percentages of causal negligence be-
tween them as in any other negligence action. However, if the
jury's assessment attributed a greater amount of negligence to
the drinker, the court would change the percentage to assess
the provider with fifty-one percent of the negligence as a mat-
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ter of law. If the jury attributed a greater amount of negli-
gence to the provider, the percentages would not be changed.
In an action brought by a third party, the jury's assess-
ment of negligence would dictate the third party's right to re-
cover as against each of the defendants, as in any other
negligence action. However, as between the provider and the
drinker, the provider must bear the greater burden and would
have to be ultimately responsible for at least fifty-one percent
of the award.
This approach would satisfy most of the policy concerns in
liquor liability cases. The deterrence purpose for imposing lia-
bility on providers would be served because providers would
not be able to pass off all of the responsibility for intoxicated
torts on to the drinker and would have to bear the largest bur-
den of the damages. The policy of protecting intoxicated
adults and minors from their own foreseeable negligence
would be served because they would be assured, in an action
for their own injuries, of recovering at least fifty-one percent
of their damages. The concern with totally absolving intoxi-
cated persons of responsibility for their actions would be met
because such persons would ultimately bear up to forty-nine
percent of the responsibility for their own injuries and dam-
ages (or, in a third-party action, up to forty-nine percent in
contribution). Yet, an injured third-party's rights would not
be affected because the percentages would be changed only for
purposes of determining contribution rights between the
defendants.
The alternative is to make all-or-nothing choices between
competing policies. The tragedy of intoxicated torts present
unique liability problems. It can only be effectively addressed
by unique solutions, not rigid applications of pre-existing
rules.
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